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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The failings of the public defense system are well chronicled and oft 
bemoaned,
1
 but for me the failings are also personal.  My story is almost a cliché.  
I was a young, idealistic lawyer, fresh out of a clerkship, when I got my first job as 
a public defender.  It was my dream job, the last legal job that I would ever have.  
It lasted for two years.  Still a relatively young and idealistic lawyer, I got my 
second, even dreamier dream job.  I became a Federal Public Defender, once again 
convinced of my forever, true calling.  That gig lasted four years.  The forces that 
drove me to leave both jobs are common ones that are cited by former public 
defenders
2
 and studied by academics like myself: heavy caseloads and workloads, 
poor management policies and practices, and bad office cultures.
3
 
When I was hired as an Assistant Professor, I was given a stern lecture on 
high expectations and the ruthless nature of up-or-out promotion and tenure.  I was 
thrilled.  Finally, I worked in a meritocracy, with quantifiable performance 
measures and consequences for failing to perform.  The academy also gave me an 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
*
   Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  My thanks to Guido for letting 
me publicly embarrass him even more than most older sisters usually do.  This is dedicated to Nancy, 
Bill, Allison, Mark, Mike, Quinn, Ann, Marc, John, Tim, Joe, yet another Mark, Steve, Matt, Robert, 
and everyone who is still kicking ass when I just couldn’t any more.  I haven’t named names, but I 
haven’t exactly disguised the guilty, either.  Thanks, tenure. 
1   See generally Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No. I 
Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4 (1971); Ting T. Cheng et al., Notes From 
the Field: Challenges of Indigent Public Defense, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 203 (2008); Frank D. Eamen, 
Public Defense in Michigan: From the Top to the Bottom, MICH. BAR J., Nov. 2008, at 40; Michael 
McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 581 (1987); Frank X. Neuner, Jr., The Funding Crisis in the Louisiana Public 
Defender System: Public Defense Reform Has Far to Go, 60 LA. B. J. 110 (2012); Scott Russell, 
Public Defenders: A Weakened but Indispensable Link, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 20 (2009); Andrea 
Woods, The Undersigned Attorney Hereby Certifies: Ensuring Reasonable Caseloads for 
Washington Defenders and Clients, 89 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2014). 
2   I use “public defender” in the broadest sense of any attorney appointed to represent 
defendants, including those working at public defense agencies, in consortiums and on panels, and by 
direct court appointment. 
3   See, e.g., Jan Pudlow, 11th Circuit PD Says His Office Is at ‘The Breaking Point’, FL. BAR NEWS (Jan. 15, 
2009), available at https://www.floridabar.org/__85256aa9005b9f25.nsf/0/cfdc482f56dc686285257536004fa5ac! 
OpenDocument&Click=.  Cf. Jonathan Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to 
Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177 (2008) (arguing that cultural factors were responsible for 
inadequate representation). 
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outlet for my frustrations, a platform from which I could study the public defense 
system, try to reform it, and train (and maybe inoculate) my students to work in it. 
Then, there is the second part of the cliché: the Freudian part.  My brother 
suffers from mental illness.  He does not like to take medication or otherwise 
comply with the recommendations of his treatment providers.  As a result, he is a 
frequent flyer in his local criminal court.  As I am writing this Essay, he is being 
represented by the metropolitan defender service for a low-level felony charge (his 
first).  My experience with my brother’s current case has dredged up anger and 
frustration that I did not realize that I still had.  It is like I am suffering from some 
kind of PPDTSD (post-PD TSD).  In fairness, I did not go into his case with high 
expectations for his public defenders, which they have unsurprisingly met.  Don’t 
get me wrong.  They are nice people who want to do well and help him.  They just 
aren’t doing either particularly well. 
All of which inspired me to revisit my experiences as a public defender—
what was broken, why I left, what I wished had been different—with the benefit of 
more than six years now to decompress and observe the system from the outside.  
Everyone agrees that the system is broken—the Innocence Project and DNA 
exonerations have made that conclusion almost unassailable
4—but it is harder to 
put your finger on why the public defense system is such a mess, beyond the 
obvious culprits of overwork and underpay. 
I have tried to answer that question in a more impersonal, scholarly way, but I 
have come to realize that the answer for me will always be colored by the personal 
and anecdotal.  There is a robust academic context for many of my personal 
observations.  Jonathan Rapping has written insightfully on the dysfunctional 
cultural environments of public defense offices.
5
  Stephen Schulhofer has explored 
the “assembly line” of public defense6 and documented the “incentive problems” 
of defense agencies.
7
  What follows are my more personal reflections about the 
system.  This Essay includes some of the inside secrets of the trade, so inside and 
so secret that public defenders do not talk about them, even among themselves, 
because to do so would unravel the delicate rationalizations about “experience” 
and “choices” that keep so many of them psychologically afloat.  It also includes 
“war stories,” which I generally find tedious and self-absorbed, but which, in this 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4   See Carrie Leonetti, The Two-Legged Stool: The Asymmetry of American Aid for the Rule 
of Law and the Risk of Wrongful Conviction, in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 87, 
97–103 (Sarah Cooper ed., 2014) (discussing the relationship between wrongful convictions, high 
caseloads, and ineffective assistance of counsel). 
5   See Rapping, supra note 3 (discussing attitudes, assumptions, and pressures underlying 
public defense culture). 
6   See Stephen Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 137, 137 (1986). 
7   See Stephen Schulhofer & David Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting 
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal 
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 78 (1993). 
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case, I think illustrate some hurdles that zealous defenders face and help explain 
why many of us leave.
8
 
 
II. WAIVER 
 
There are a handful of rights afforded to defendants that only they can 
knowingly waive.
9
  Most of their remaining rights are either asserted or waived by 
their attorneys, including by forfeiture—waiver by inaction.  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with waiving a client’s rights.  It depends on why a lawyer 
waives them.  I have classified the waivers that I have observed into four broad 
(and oversimplified) categories: strategic, ignorant, lazy, and institutional.  
Strategy is a good reason; the other three are not. 
Let me illustrate with an example.  Any lawyer who has arraigned
10
 a client 
has, at some point, uttered the phrase: “Waive further reading and advisement.”  
The statement is shorthand for waiving the client’s right to have the judge explain 
the charges and their consequences and advise the client of his/her constitutional 
rights (silence, counsel, etc.).  It is unlikely that anyone reading this has ever seen a 
full reading of charges and advisement of rights in an American courtroom.  I was 
a public defender for six years, and I never have.  Like all waivers, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with waiving reading and advisement—I did it hundreds of 
times—but this waiver makes a good example of the four classes of motivations 
that I have enumerated.  
 
A. Strategic Waiver 
 
You meet with a client prior to the arraignment, go over the charging 
document, the potential imprisonment, the process to come, and the rights entailed.  
During this interview, which is thankfully confidential, your client confesses, 
repeatedly.  Your client may not think that it is a confession.  On the contrary, 
confessions often start with: “They’ve got it all wrong.”  I could not count the 
number of times that I had to tell a new client that a brilliant investment strategy 
was a Ponzi scheme.  “That’s a Ponzi scheme. . . .  Yes, I understand, but that’s a 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8   I hope that it goes without saying that, while I believe that my experiences were typical, 
there are lawyers and offices resisting the dysfunction that I identify. 
9   See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1993) (holding that a defendant may only 
waive the right to counsel or plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 835 (1975) (holding that a waiver of the right to counsel had to be knowing and voluntary); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the waiver of the right to counsel and 
silence during custodial interrogation had to be knowing and voluntary); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 469 (1938) (holding that Johnson could only waive his right to counsel knowingly and 
voluntarily); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (holding that the decision to waive a 
jury was personal to Patton). 
10  I use “arraignment” not necessarily in its formal sense of arraignment and plea on an 
indictment, but rather in its informal sense of a defendant’s first appearance in court on any charge. 
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Ponzi scheme. . . .  Okay, let me put it to you this way.  What would have 
happened if there were no new investors after the initial ones? . . .  Exactly.  That’s 
a Ponzi scheme. . . . Yes, it is. . . .  Yes, it is. . . .  Yes, it is. . . .  Fine, just don’t 
talk to anyone else about this, okay?”  These confessions are a strategic reason to 
waive reading and advisement: the concern that your clients will “go over your 
head” to explain their “innocence” in open court. 
 
B. Ignorant Waiver 
 
You are a brand new public defender, straight out of law school.  Your first 
week at work (or externship perhaps) involves observing other lawyers, including 
the “duty” lawyer who is handling arraignments.  You quickly notice that there is a 
script: “I accept appointment on behalf of the public defender’s office.  I have 
received a copy of the complaint.  My client’s name is set forth correctly 
thereupon.  I waive further reading and advisement of rights and request a 
detention hearing.”  You take frantic notes: “Accept.  TN.  Waive rdg & advice.  
D/H.”  The next week, you are assigned your first duty calendar.  You faithfully 
read your script.  You have no idea what the proceeding would look like if you did 
not waive reading and advisement, and you have not thought about why you are 
doing it.  You are just trying to look like someone who is not arraigning a client for 
the first time.
 
 
 
C. Lazy Waiver a/k/a (Caseload Waiver or Triage Waiver)  
 
It takes about forty-five minutes to complete a typical arraignment calendar, 
but it would take five or six hours to arraign everyone if the judge had to do a full 
reading and advisement for all the defendants.  You have not yet met with the 
waiting jump-suited defendants, but someone in your office will in the next day or 
two, and that person will go over the charges, etc.  It is an imperfect system, but 
you have a massive and unwieldy caseload, choices have to be made, and watching 
a judge struggle through a dense, lengthy script about the right to counsel is not a 
good use of anyone’s limited time and resources.  
 
D. Institutional Waiver  
 
Your office has a standing agreement with the local court always to take care 
of reading and advisement so that the Court can speed its docket along.  This 
practice helps to foster the “good working relationship” that your office has with 
the prosecutors and judges, which your boss believes somehow helps your clients 
collectively in the long run.  Also, if you demanded a full reading and advisement, 
you would anger the Court, and no one likes to get yelled at, especially by 
someone with contempt powers.  Part of your job is playing nice, even at the 
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expense of acting as an agent for your clients, who fall into some combination of 
not caring or loving it when you piss off the judge and prosecutor.
11
   
I would love it if most of the time that public defenders waive, forfeit, or fail 
to assert clients’ rights, it is strategic, but, in my experience, like so many of their 
other routine decisions, it is not.  These waivers occur without reflection, to speed 
things along, and to further institutional relationships. 
 
E. Guilty Plea Waiver 
 
The most frequent waiver is one that public defenders repeatedly recommend: 
the guilty plea, which constitutes a waiver of pretty much all rights (other than the 
right to a voluntary guilty plea).  This waiver is often done for non-strategic 
reasons as well.  Here is an example.  I was sitting in court one morning during the 
court’s regular “law and motion” docket, the weekly docket during which the court 
takes care of routine matters in criminal cases—status conferences, non-
evidentiary motion and sentencing hearings, and guilty pleas.  A uniquely lazy 
colleague of mine had a client pleading guilty.  I likely would not have paid 
attention to someone else’s plea, except that the judge seemed really resistant to 
the guilty plea, which is not a common occurrence.  Typically, when a defendant 
has accepted a plea offer, there is a long colloquy that a judge has to go through 
before accepting the guilty plea.  It is essentially a script about the defendant’s 
rights, options, mental status, etc., to make sure that the decision to plead guilty is 
voluntary.
12
  Because judges ask these questions of hundreds of defendants every 
month, and because less-scrupulous lawyers tend to “coach” their clients how to 
answer them ahead of time (I have actually seen lawyers nudge, elbow, and step on 
the toes of clients to get them to change a “no” to a “yes” or vice versa), the 
conversation usually occurs at high-speed monotone.  During this hearing, 
however, the judge appeared to be going off script and becoming animated, trying 
to make absolutely sure that this was really, really, really something that the 
defendant wanted.  Ultimately, he permitted the defendant to plead guilty, but 
something about the judge’s demeanor during the plea and the identity of the 
lawyer involved made me curious.  When I got back to my office, I pulled a copy 
of the plea agreement from the court’s electronic filing system. 
The defendant had been charged with first-degree murder.  Because the 
Assistant United States Attorney [AUSA] had not been authorized to seek the 
death penalty or filed notice of his intent to do so, the maximum sentence that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11  In my experience, defense attorneys who play along do not get good deals.  Prosecutors do 
not make plea offers because they like you.  They make plea offers because they fear you (if not your 
brilliance, then at least your power to make them work nights and weekends). 
12  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Committee’s notes; see, e.g., 
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 33–35 (1995) (describing Libretti’s plea colloquy). 
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defendant faced was life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
13
  Under 
the terms of the “deal,” the defendant agreed to plead guilty to first-degree murder, 
admit all of the alleged facts (including the mental state that made the murder first 
rather than second degree), agree to a sentence of life imprisonment (without 
parole), and waive all rights to appeal and habeas corpus.  If you are thinking, 
“Isn’t that the worst-case scenario if there were no guilty plea?”  Yes.  He was 
pleading guilty to the “top” count of the indictment, agreeing to the maximum 
possible sentence, and waiving all of his rights, including the right to further 
judicial review.  I was a public defender for six years, and I have been a law 
professor for longer than that.  I can think of reasons why that plea agreement may 
have benefited my colleague, but I cannot think of even an implausible-but-
theoretically-possible reason why accepting that deal was in her client’s best 
interest.
14
 
 
III. FUTILITY 
 
One of the striking (and for me, surprising and disappointing) aspects of the 
criminal-justice system is how many bad trial-court judges there are, particularly in 
county systems.  By bad, I mean people who could not structure or evaluate a 
coherent legal doctrine with two hands and a flashlight and, quite frankly, have no 
interest in doing so anyway.  No one likes to say that out loud, much less write it 
down and publish it, but it is true.  A lot of state court judges are ineligible for 
Mensa. 
Defense attorneys lose most of the time.  Contrary to what you see on Law 
and Order, the system is stacked, heavily, against defendants.  That is not the hard 
part of the job, though, losing cases because the law is against you.  The hard part 
is losing when the law is on your side.  Any halfway decent defender reading this 
is nodding now.  You file a meritorious motion, citing the authorities that support 
it.  The prosecutor files a stupid response, mis-citing the authorities.  It does not 
appear that the judge understands the nuance of your argument (or has read the 
motion), but that does not stop the judge from denying it. 
These same not-always-brilliant trial courts like to adopt policies and 
procedures, sometimes through formal rules, other times through informal 
practices.  The purpose of these policies is usually to streamline the court’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13  See 18 U.S.C. §1111(b) (1948) (affixing the punishment for first-degree murder as death or 
life imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. §3593(a) (1994) (requiring the Government to file pretrial notice of its 
intent to seek the death penalty); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-
10.050 (2014) (establishing internal Department of Justice protocol in all potentially capital federal 
cases and prohibiting an AUSA from seeking death, “the Attorney General will make the final 
decision whether to seek the death penalty”). 
14  Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969) (finding Boykin’s guilty plea to capital 
robbery, made at his arraignment, to be unconstitutional in part because the record gave no indication 
of any strategic benefit to Boykin of the plea). 
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caseload or “enhance courtroom security.”  What is wrong with that?  Start with 
the stunning frequency with which these procedures are patently unconstitutional.  
This is one of the first shocks that smart defenders experience.  You take criminal-
procedure and trial-practice classes in law school.  You study under brilliant 
lawyers who teach best practices.  Then, a public defender’s office hires you, and 
you start going to court, entering the rabbit hole.  At first you just watch, kind of 
confused, but eventually you go through a three-stage process. 
Stage One involves some variation of this conversation with a senior attorney 
in your office: 
 
You: “Um, that thing that the court is doing seems kind of 
unconstitutional.” 
 
Senior Lawyer: “Don’t get me started.  Of course it’s unconstitutional.” 
 
You: “Oh, right, I thought so . . . .” 
 
End of conversation. 
 
It continues to bug you.  It is not just that the court is failing to do something 
that the Supreme Court has said that it is required to do (often decades ago).  It is 
that no one in the room tries to do anything about it.  They just seem resigned to 
the hopeless illegality.  Eventually, you work up the nerve to enter Stage Two: 
revisiting the issue. 
 
You: “So, um, you know that thing that the court is constitutionally 
required to do but doesn’t?  Um, well, should we do something about it?”  
 
Senior Attorney: “Believe me, we’ve tried.  But it goes nowhere.”  
 
Well, at least you tried once?  I cannot tell you how many times, as a young 
public defender, I ran a legal argument by a senior attorney whose response was 
simply, “You’ll never win that.” Not, “You’re wrong,” or, “You might want to 
look at this case before you file that,” or any other objection to the merits.  Just, 
“That’s hopeless and, therefore, a waste of your time.”  I think of this as 
futility/frivolity distinction confusion syndrome.  That needs a better name, but 
here is the point.  An argument that has no legal basis is frivolous.  An argument 
that has a sound legal basis but a lawyer likely won’t win because the judge is too 
feckless to appreciate its merits, at least in the short term and without an enormous 
amount of work and tenacity, might seem futile, but is not frivolous.  It is a 
lawyer’s duty not to do things that are frivolous.  It is not a lawyer’s duty to avoid 
things that seem futile. 
Eventually, you get senior enough where you are no longer under direct 
supervision and can make independent decisions.  You are more confident in your 
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skills now and likely less confident in the skills of those around you, so you enter 
Stage Three: taking matters into your own hands.  You make an objection or file a 
motion or otherwise protest this illegal practice.  If you are lucky, the illegal 
practice ends.  It might work because the judge recognizes that your argument is 
well reasoned and researched, but probably not.  More likely it will work the 
hundredth time because the judges eventually figure out that you are going to keep 
pestering them (making objections, slowing down dockets, filing motions, setting 
up appeals) until they change their practice, and it becomes easier to change the 
practice than to deal with your hectoring.  Or the judge denies your motion, and the 
appellate court reverses the decision, which trial judges pretend not to care about, 
except that they do, especially when some young public defender told them so. 
All of which is a fantastic victory for your clients, justice, integrity, the 
American way, maybe even your poor bedraggled ego.  A handful of your 
colleagues will congratulate you, but you should brace yourself for the blowback.  
I’ll pose it as a hypothetical.  Imagine that a young and inexperienced public 
defender achieves an impressive litigation victory after engaging in a novel 
strategy that various senior attorneys in her office advised her was a waste of time.  
The result will be: (a) the prosecutors and judges are furious, but her office 
celebrates her tenacity and dedication and defends her from their retaliation; (b) the 
prosecutors and judges are unhappy with the victory, but respect her intellect and 
are professional enough not to take it personally; (c) when her office hears about 
the victory, with a few exceptions, they ostracize her, talk about how she lacks 
“judgment,” will “burn out” soon, or both, and learn nothing from this feedback 
about their earlier advice; or (d) the victory weirdly becomes the catalyst for her to 
leave the office for academia.  It’s a trick question, actually.  The answer is 
definitely (c) and maybe (b) and (d), if you’re lucky. Result (c) is what happens 
when you force an ostrich’s head out of the sand, and all that it cares about is 
getting it back there as quickly as possible.  Result (d) happens when you value 
your sanity and sobriety. 
 
IV. THE COMBINE: CULTURE OF DEFENSIVENESS 
 
All institutions have acculturation mechanisms.  In legal practice, positive 
ones include wearing suits and calling people Mr. or Ms.  In defender offices, 
negative ones include not rocking the boat.  There are lots of mechanisms to do 
this.  I believe that they exist more to support a network of rationalization and 
excuses than purposely to punish zealous defenders, but punish them they do. 
Here is another true story from my time in practice, involving my former boss 
who tried to fire me on the ground that I had won a long and complicated piece of 
litigation over his express objection.  No, that’s not a typo.  I almost got fired for 
winning. 
I spent months researching, writing, and challenging an unconstitutional 
district-wide policy.  After approximately eight hours of oral argument in the 
District Court, my motion was partially granted.  The District Court’s ruling 
2015] PAINTING THE ROSES RED 379 
 
 
denying the other part of the motion was eventually overruled on appeal, resulting 
in a total victory.  At one point during this litigation, my boss held a meeting at 
which he informed every lawyer in the office that I was reckless and that my 
litigation strategy constituted malpractice, but the worst moment actually came 
after my District Court victory.  I think that the entire courthouse had gotten wind 
of how much trouble I was in at my office, so, a few days after issuing his ruling, 
the judge in the case, a lovely man who was trying to be chivalrous, called my boss 
to tell him what an exceptional job I had done litigating the matter.  I pride myself 
at being pretty good at angering people.  The ability to inspire rage quietly and 
politely was one of the things that I liked about being a defender.  But I have never 
seen rage like my boss’s reaction to the judge’s phone call, other than on an 
episode of Cops.  It was volcanic.  It is possible that the reaction was a simple, 
human reaction to the egg that he had on his face for publicly berating my 
ultimately successful strategy, but I think that it was more than that.   
Throughout our several-month disagreement over the litigation (during which 
time I actually retained an employment lawyer in the event that he fired me), he 
repeatedly kept yelling (and when I say yelling, I mean that people would walk by 
my office when he was on the phone and ask if I was all right because they could 
hear him, through my phone, up the hallway) that I “didn’t know my place on the 
totem pole,” by which he clearly meant that I was not senior enough to have taken 
on the project.  He never once criticized the substance of any of my decisions.  He 
just objected to the fact that I was making them, which is weird given that, in four 
years as a federal defender, I filed hundreds of motions, and no one ever suggested 
that I lacked the seniority to do so before.  Which is why I think that his rage was 
more about acculturation.  I was in trouble because I was a junior attorney 
challenging a longstanding policy of questionable constitutionality that none of the 
senior attorneys in the office had bothered to challenge before, and that was 
unacceptable.
15
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
15  To be fair to my former colleagues, within a few weeks of filing my motion challenging the 
court policy, two other lawyers in my office filed similar motions on behalf of their clients, which 
were joined with my case.  But that fact actually makes the acculturation argument more compelling, 
and here is why.  At one point during the protracted litigation in the District Court, one of the other 
(much more senior) attorneys in the consolidated case filed an objection to a piece of evidence that 
the Government had proffered, and I joined the motion.  In the upper corner of the motion, his name 
was first, and mine was second—same thing with the case caption, his client first, mine second.  
Shortly after he filed the motion, my boss called the head of my branch office and ordered him to fire 
me because of this motion, which I had joined, but neither authored nor filed.  The motion was fairly 
technical, involving rules of appellate procedure and the evidentiary law of authenticity, and my boss 
was enraged at the use of the word “purportedly” in the motion—seriously, he wanted me fired 
because my colleague had used the word “purportedly” in an evidentiary motion.  The head of my 
office refused to fire me, no doubt because he did not want to be named as a defendant in the 
wrongful-termination suit, so he negotiated, on my behalf, a lesser sanction—a sort-of in-office 
probation.  But here is the craziest part: no one ever said a word to the attorney who wrote and filed 
the motion, who had been in the office for more than fifteen years—not only was he not fired or 
yelled at or placed on “probation,” the administration reacted as if I had solely filed the motion, 
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A. Evaluating Performance 
 
One mechanism of acculturation in defender offices is performance 
evaluation.  The performance evaluations of zealous defenders tend to say things 
like “concerns about judgment” or “disproportionate use of office resources.”  The 
problem is that those assessments, in my experience, exist devoid of any objective 
measures of performance—acquittal rates, reversal rates, average sentences. 
An attorney who advises a client with no viable defense to turn down a three-
year deal, resulting in a twenty-year sentence after a guilty verdict that the jury 
reached in less than five minutes of deliberation, exercises poor judgment.  An 
attorney who advises a client to turn down a three-year deal and then wins a 
motion to dismiss has exercised excellent judgment (or at least made a lucky 
guess).  Without outcome measures, there is no way to know who is reckless and 
who is zealous. 
Here an example of this kind of acculturating “performance evaluation.”  My 
first performance review as a federal defender contained the following sentence in 
the “needs improvement” column: “Carrie uses a disproportionate amount of 
investigation resources.”  Naturally, I was concerned.  When I met with my boss to 
discuss the evaluation, the conversation went like this: 
 
Me: “Am I engaging in frivolous investigations?” 
 
Boss: “No, of course not.  We wouldn’t wait until your annual evaluation 
if that were the case.” 
 
Me: “Um, okay, so why does this comment appear in the ‘needs 
improvement’ column of my evaluation?” 
 
Boss: “According to our records, this past year, you submitted 173 
requests for investigation assistance.  We have ten lawyers in the office, 
but your investigation requests constituted 50% of all the investigation 
hours logged.” 
 
Me: “But none of those 173 requests were frivolous?” 
 
Boss: “No, they were all appropriate.  There were just way too many.  
Let me try to explain this another way.  [Another lawyer] submitted three 
requests for that same time period.  Do you see how far you are out the 
continuum?” 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
because it was not the motion, it was the name on it, and I had not yet earned the right to fight for my 
clients. 
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Me: “Um, well that kind of sounds like more of an issue for [the other 
lawyer]’s performance evaluation.” 
 
My boss never appreciated my subtle wit.  A different year, my evaluation 
said “concerns about Carrie’s judgment.”  My follow-up meeting went like this: 
 
Me: “Wow, [boss], that’s a serious allegation.  Can you give me an 
example of how I’ve exercised poor judgment?” 
 
Boss: “You’ve advised a significant percentage of your clients to turn 
down plea offers, instead filing motions, requesting supplemental 
discovery, issuing subpoenas.  You engage in very aggressive litigation 
tactics.  I’ve been getting calls from the U.S. Attorney’s Office that 
you’re difficult to deal with.” 
 
Me: “Ok, I see, but can you give me an example of a situation in which 
my ‘aggressive litigation’ has left a client worse off, a time when a client 
followed my advice, turned down a plea offer, and ended up getting more 
time?” 
 
Boss: “No.” 
 
Me: “Well, then, how can you describe those decisions as poor 
judgment?” 
 
Boss: “You just don’t seem to have a good working relationship with the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office.” 
 
Me: “I say ‘good morning’ and ‘please’ and ‘thank you.’  No one has had 
me audited by the IRS.  More importantly, I tend to get better plea offers 
compared to other lawyers in this office.  What makes you think that I 
don’t have a good relationship with their office?” 
 
Boss: “You’re just very aggressive.” 
 
B. Social Pressure 
 
There is also social acculturation, the subtle suggestions that you don’t play 
well with others, that it’s sad that you take pleasure in pyrrhic victories, that you’re 
wasting time and resources working through things that you ought to be working 
through with your shrink.  It’s often as fleeting as “We’ve tried that before.  Why 
do you think that you’ll get different results?”, or “Don’t you have enough cases?”  
Sometimes, it is less subtle: being assigned additional cases because you “clearly 
have time on your hands.” 
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In the district in which I worked, judges followed the sentencing guidelines 
almost religiously, even after Blakely v. Washington
16
 and United States v. 
Booker.
17
  The U.S. Attorney’s Office, even after the guidelines became advisory, 
continued to make the following plea offer in most cases: if the defendant pleads 
guilty to the top count, admits all of the aggravating facts charged, and waives all 
appellate and post-conviction rights, we will agree to a sentence at the low end of 
the guideline range.  Here is the problem with that offer—unless you are 
representing Al Capone on a tax-evasion charge or your client threatened to kill the 
judge yesterday, your client is going to get no worse than the low end of the 
guidelines anyway.  And related counts almost always merge for sentencing under 
the federal guidelines, so dismissing any count other than the top count, barring 
some kind of collateral consequence like immigration penalties or sex-offender 
registration, is basically worthless.  Early on in my career, I coined a retort that I 
liked to use in these situations: “That’s a plea offer, but not a plea bargain.”  I 
started having my clients plead guilty to the indictment, without a plea agreement, 
and taking their chances with the court at sentencing.  I do not have exact statistics, 
but I would estimate that about half of the time that I did that, followed up of 
course with substantial investigation and a lengthy sentencing memorandum, my 
clients “beat” the deal, not usually by much, maybe getting 48 months when the 
plea agreement had called for 51.
18
  The other maybe half of the time, my clients 
got the same low-end-of-the-guidelines sentence that the plea agreement had 
offered, except without waiving their appellate and post-conviction rights, which 
can be valuable.  During the eight years that I practiced law, the Supreme Court 
decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,
19
 Crawford v. Washington,
20
 Rothgery v. 
Gillespie County,
21
 and several other cases adopting “watershed rules of criminal 
procedure,” which are rule changes that might retroactively benefit people already 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16  542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (holding that an aggravated sentence, based on the judge's finding 
of an aggravating circumstance that was neither pleaded nor proven to the jury, violated the Sixth 
Amendment). 
17  543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005) (holding that the Sixth Amendment required severance of the 
provision of the Federal Sentencing Act making the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory). 
18  If, like some of my former colleagues, you don’t think that there is a real difference 
between a forty-eight month and a fifty-one month sentence, I think that you should spend three 
months in prison. 
19  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that 
increased the maximum penalty had to be submitted and proven to the jury). 
20  541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2003) (overturning Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1984), and holding 
that the Confrontation Clause barred admission of testimonial out-of-court statements unless the 
declarants were unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, 
regardless of reliability). 
21  554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (holding that the initial appearance, during which a defendant is 
advised of the charges and the defendant’s liberty is subject to restriction, marked the initiation of 
adversary proceedings triggering attachment of the right to counsel). 
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convicted
22—but only if they have not waived their post-conviction rights.23  In 
both cases (“tying” or “beating” the rejected deal by a small margin), both the 
prosecutors and many of the lawyers in my office acted as if it had been a colossal 
waste of time.  One time, I advised a client to reject a deal, which he did, and he 
got a low-end guideline sentence anyway after a six hour sentencing hearing. The 
AUSA made a crack to me about wasting so much of my time.  I replied: “I tied 
the deal that I rejected, without having to waive my client’s rights.  I’m pretty sure 
that you’re the one who wasted your time.”  The reaction was the same when I 
“beat” the deal—that I had somehow “wasted” all of these precious office 
resources spending countless hours and killing countless trees “just” to get my 
client a few months off. 
The only people who seemed to get it (other than my clients, who, contrary to 
the stereotype that bad public defenders often promote, were very grateful) were 
the judges.  One of the last sentencing hearings that I had was before a pretty 
conservative, former-prosecutor judge, the same one who had tried to do me a 
solid with the phone call to my boss a few months earlier.  It was a half-day affair, 
during which I presented substantial mitigating evidence on my client’s behalf.  
Mostly, the evidence consisted of the nature of her mental illness and horrible 
childhood abuse that probably contributed to it—the same mitigating evidence that 
most criminal defendants have, if investigated and presented.  At the end of the 
hearing, the judge gave my client a sentence substantially below her guidelines.  
After the Court recessed, I had this conversation. 
 
Judge: “Boy, Ms. Leonetti, your clients seem to have the most incredible 
mitigating circumstances.  It’s amazing how you always draw these 
really sympathetic clients.” 
 
Me: “Your Honor, with all due respect, seriously?  I work in an office 
with ten lawyers.  Our cases are assigned pretty much at random.  I’m 
not a statistician, but don’t you think that me ‘drawing’ all of the 
sympathetic ones is, um, mathematically unlikely?” 
 
I will never forget the look on his face as it slowly dawned on him that he 
spent most of his days hammering equally sympathetic defendants simply because 
their lawyers were not doing their jobs. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
22  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315–16 (1989) (holding that a new constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure would apply retroactively if the failure to do so would undermine the fundamental 
fairness of the prior proceedings or diminish the likelihood of an accurate conviction). 
23  See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 288 (1975) (holding that in the normal case a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea barred subsequent constitutional challenges to pre-plea 
proceedings); see, e.g., Brown v. Herbert, 288 F. Supp. 2d 351, 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that, 
when Brown admitted his guilt, he could not thereafter raise claims relating to the deprivation of his 
rights before his guilty plea). 
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C. “Mentoring” 
 
There is a popular critique about legal education right now.  It goes like this: 
Law schools should spend less time teaching students to “think like lawyers” and 
more time teaching students to “practice.”24  Some have advocated two years of 
law school and a third year that is more like an apprenticeship.
25
 
I have no idea how valid these complaints and proposals are for future 
intellectual-property or family-law lawyers, but they make me very nervous for 
future criminal lawyers for this reason: “Practical skills training” in criminal law 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
24  See generally JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: 
RESISTANCE AND RESPONSES TO CHANGE (2013); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION (2007); RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE (2013); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); Margaret Martin Barry, Practice Ready: Are We There Yet?, 32 B.C. J. 
L. & SOC. JUST. 247 (2012); Brandon R. Ceglian, Bridging the Gap Between Law School and Law 
Practice, COLO. LAW., May 2008, at 59; Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Brian D. Einhorn, Waltz a Little 
Faster, They Are Playing a Tango, 93 MICH. B. J. 18 (2014); Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law 
Teaching–Now, 62 EMORY L. J. 823 (2013); Gary S. Laser, Educating for Professional Competence 
in the Twenty-First Century, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 243 (1992); Robert M. Lloyd, Hard Law Firms 
and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L. REV. 667 (2005); Sara K. Rankin, Tired of Talking: A Call for 
Clear Strategies for Legal Education Reform: Moving Beyond the Discussion of Good Ideas to the 
Real Transformation of Law Schools, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 11 (2011); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal 
Skills Training in the First Year of Law School: Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100 DICK. 
L. REV. 245 (1996); Karen Tokarz et al., Legal Education at a Crossroads: Innovation, Integration, 
and Pluralism Required!, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11 (2013); Stefanie M. Benson, It Is Time for 
Legal Education to Prepare Law Students for Law Practice, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, May 2005, at 12; 
Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2012, at SR10; 
David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1; 
cf. Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 
735, 736 (2011); Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ 
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct 
Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105, 113 (2010); Karen Sloan, ABA: Law Schools 
Getting the Message on Practical Skills, NAT’L L.J., July 5, 2012, available at 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202561943191? (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  But see 
Leonard J. Long, Resisting Anti-Intellectualism and Promoting Legal Literacy, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 
(2009). 
25  See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 280–95 
(1999); Robertson B. Cohen, An Alternative to Law School: The Apprenticeship Model, COLO. LAW., 
May 2009, at 83, 89; Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar Eligibility 
After Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 606 (2012) (advocating for two 
years of law school plus a pro-bono hour requirement, but not a strict apprenticeship requirement); Ruth Tam, 
Obama: Law Schools Should Think About Being ‘Two Years Instead of Three’, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/23/obama-law-schools-should-think-about-
being-two-years-instead-of-three/?wpisrc=nlpmpo; Debra Cassens Weiss, Two-Year Law School Was a Good 
Idea in 1970, and It's a Good Idea Now, Prof Tells ABA Task Force, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 10, 2013, 1:36 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/two-year_law_school_was_a_good_idea_in_1970_and_its_a_good_ 
idea_now. 
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often involves being handed a giant stack of cases and trained to parrot the 
practices of others, without critical reflection or being taught the “best practice” 
skills of due diligence, investigation, research, and statutory construction that 
empower them to reinvent a better wheel.  I have counseled students to take jobs in 
large, corporate litigation departments immediately after graduation, slogging 
through tedious “document review” and carrying briefcases for senior lawyers, 
before trying to get jobs as public defenders (or prosecutors) because I have so 
little faith in the “on-the-job training” of the criminal justice system. 
Here is an example.  I worked in a public defense office with ten attorneys.  
Toward the end of my time there, I became the ninth most senior lawyer in the 
office when the office hired a new attorney to replace a colleague who had left.  
One day, my new colleague came into my office to ask me a question about the 
Bail Reform Act [BRA],
26
 a notoriously incomprehensible statute.  Accustomed to 
law clerks asking me what statutes said without having read them, I snapped, 
“What does the statute say?!”  He responded with an incredibly nuanced 
construction of this cumbersome statute.  The issue that he was attempting to 
resolve is somewhat complicated, but I will describe it as briefly as possible.   
In the federal system, all defendants can be detained pending trial if they pose 
a flight risk.
27
  Some, but not all defendants, can also be detained if they pose a risk 
of “danger” to the community.28  So, the first question that a defender should ask is 
whether the defendant is eligible for detention due to dangerousness.  If not, 
defendants can only be detained if they pose a flight risk.  Almost all of the crimes 
that render a defendant eligible for dangerousness detention are subject to a 
“rebuttable presumption” of dangerousness—shifting the burden to the defendant 
to prove safety.  There is a small subset of dangerousness crimes, however, to 
which the rebuttable presumption does not apply, placing the burden on the 
Government.
29
  My recollection is that this small category comprises mostly gun 
charges.  In other words, white-collar criminals can only be detained if they might 
flee.  Drug dealers and child sex offenders are presumptively detained.  Gun 
possessors can be detained if they might flee or be dangerous, but the Government 
has to prove the likelihood of the latter.  My new colleague was representing a 
client who had been charged with illegal gun possession.  He believed that his 
client could be detained if he posed a danger to the community, but was not subject 
to the presumption of danger.  I apologized for biting his head off, confirmed his 
construction of the statute, and congratulated him, since the BRA is so 
complicated.  Instead of leaving my office at that point, though, he closed the door. 
 
Him: “Are you sure?” 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26  18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008). 
27  See id. § 3142(f). 
28  See id. 
29  See id. § 3142(e)(3). 
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Me: “Well, yes, but it doesn’t really matter if I’m sure.  Are you 
unsure?” 
 
Then it clicked. 
 
Me: “Have you asked other attorneys in the office?” 
 
He had.  Of the eight other attorneys in the office, he had asked seven before 
he got to me.  All seven other attorneys had assured him, incorrectly, that his client 
was subject to the rebuttable presumption. 
 
Me: “Did they show you where in the statute they were getting that?” 
 
Of course not.  They had all just answered off the top of their heads, without 
bothering to consult the statute.  This is what Rapping refers to as “shooting from 
the hip.”30 
This is why I personally think that we need the third year of law school.  My 
former colleague luckily went to an excellent law school that trained him in 
“skills” far better than any “practical training” at a defender’s office could have.  
And he was right.  His client was released from jail when the judge ruled that he 
was not subject to the rebuttable presumption. 
 
V. GREASING THE WHEELS OF JUSTICE: THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
 
The truth is that defense attorneys, especially public defenders, do a service 
for the rest of the criminal justice system: they grease it.  Don’t believe me?  Have 
you ever seen the look on a judge’s face when a defendant wants to go pro se?  We 
are a filter, waiving “unnecessary” rights, pushing plea deals, convincing our 
clients that what they want to tell the court is irrelevant or inadmissible.  And that’s 
fine, when the deal is good, the case is hopeless, and the rights that are being 
waived are less important than the prison time that is being avoided.  The problem 
is that, somewhere along the way, a lot of public defenders get co-opted.  They 
become “team players” at the expense of protecting their clients. 
One time, when I was a pretty junior defender, I was assigned as the duty 
lawyer over Christmas week.  The only judge in the building was a senior judge 
who was widely known to be senile.  I guess that I already had a reputation as a 
troublemaker, because before the judge took the bench, his clerk pulled me aside 
and said something like, “Let’s all be sensitive today,” which clearly meant “Don’t 
take advantage of him by exploiting ‘technicalities.’”  I played dumb and 
responded, “I’m sorry, what?,” which I think she understood to mean “F@*& 
Y+#, lady, I’ve got a job to do here, and it isn’t covering for your judge” because 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30  See Rapping, supra note 3, at 191. 
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she did not rephrase her request.  It is possible that I made slightly more objections 
and motions than I normally would have that day, eh hem.  It is definitely possible 
that I had a much higher percentage of objections sustained and motions granted 
than usual.  I do not feel guilty about that.  In fact, I am kind of proud of it.  I am 
also sure that most of the other attorneys in my office would have played along 
instead. 
This pressure to make it easier and more efficient for prosecutors and judges 
to convict and sentence your clients is unrelenting.  But there is an upside.  The 
system relies on you to do it.  From time to time, some academic calls for all 
public defenders to simply refuse to plead any of their clients guilty and demand 
trial in 100% of their cases.
31
  The idea is that doing so would crash the system.  Of 
course, there are problems with this suggestion.  First, attorneys do not decide how 
their clients plead.  Clients decide, and, when the deals are better than what trials 
promise, they usually choose to take them.  Second, even if you amended the 
suggestion to advising all clients to demand a trial, and even if you assumed that 
100% of defendants would follow that advice, it would still be unethical, and here 
is why: Many defendants could end up better off that way — with misdemeanors 
or even dismissals to clear the backlog.  Some defendants would end up way worse 
off, serving thirty years after trial because they turned down a five-year offer as 
part of your “break the system” strategy.  Your advice to those clients was 
malpractice.  But I sympathize with the suggestion.  There is a perception, which I 
share, that defenders do too much going along to get along and not enough 
standing up and fighting.  But there is a way to use that power/curse of greasing to 
help clients without shooting them in the foot.  Here is one small example. 
My first assignment as a federal defender was as the duty lawyer in Yosemite 
National Park.  There is a tiny full-time Magistrate Court in Yosemite that 
processes all misdemeanor cases in the Park.  If you are thinking to yourself that 
Yosemite sounds like the most idyllic defender assignment ever, you have never 
been the duty lawyer there.  In fact, I doubt that you have ever been to Yosemite.  
Picture a small municipal night court, heavy on drunk and disorderlies, but with all 
of the power and resources of the federal government.  The continued funding of 
the court and Law Enforcement Office depends upon a steady flow of new cases.  
Overkill much? 
The first day that I worked Yosemite also happened to be a new magistrate’s 
first day.  The duty day is Tuesday.  There is a 10:00 calendar for “serious” crimes, 
and a 1:30 calendar for citations.  The courthouse opens at 8:30.  When I was the 
duty defender, I would arrive at the court at 8:30.  In the winter, an hour and a half 
was plenty of time to interview the three or four defendants on the calendar.  In the 
summer, however, I would arrive to find a Friday night emergency-room crowd of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
31  See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 10, 2012, at SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-
crash-the-justice-system.html?_r=0. 
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dozens of defendants.  I started in the summer, so, my first few Tuesdays on the 
job, I’d arrive at 8:30 and start interviewing people as fast as I could.  Around 
9:55, the clerk would pop her head into my office and ask if I was ready.  I would 
say no and estimate of how much longer until I was ready.  Until a month or two 
into the gig, when one day, during her 9:55 check-in, I told her that I was only 
about half way through the waiting clients, and she responded that the judge had 
“ordered” me to be in court and ready to start by 10:00.  A judge can order you 
into a courtroom, but I was curious to see how he was going to enforce the part of 
the order that I be “ready.” 
The first case called was a client with whom I had met.  I arraigned him 
quickly and easily.  The second case, however, was one of the clients to whom I 
had not gotten before being unceremoniously told to get my butt into court.  I 
accepted the appointment, acknowledged having received the complaint, and 
stopped talking.  The judge prompted me with, “Are you waiving reading and 
advisement?”  I responded, “No, Your Honor.  I haven’t had a chance to meet with 
this client, go over the charges, and advise him of his rights, so I guess that you 
will have to do it.”  Funny thing about reading and advisement: judges never do it.  
No one ever fails to waive it.  So, they do not actually know how.  Or at least this 
judge did not.  The frantic look on his face more than made up for having been 
scolded into court.  The judge fumbled the best that he could through the charges 
and consequences, relying on the prosecutor to fill in the elements and maximum 
sentences, while his clerk ransacked her desk for a script.  But when it came time 
to advise my client of his rights, he faltered.  Criminal defendants have a lot of 
rights, at least titularly.  There was no way that he could wing it.  Instead, he asked 
me how long it would take me to advise my client so that I could waive 
advisement.  I told him fifteen-to-twenty minutes, and he took a fifteen-minute 
recess.  After the recess, he called the third case, which turned out also to be a 
client with whom I had not met.  Another fifteen-minute recess.  We went on like 
that all morning and into the 1:30 calendar, inching through the docket one fifteen-
minute continuance at a time.  Then, without a break because we were running so 
late, we started the 1:30 calendar.  Unfortunately, however, I had not met with any 
of those clients, since I was still in morning court during the lunch break.  It 
normally took about forty-five minutes to get through the morning and afternoon 
calendars.  That day we were in court for seven straight hours.  The following 
Tuesday, when I told the clerk at 9:55 that I still had clients to interview, she told 
me to take my time. 
 
VI. THE LAW OF (UN)INTENDED CONSEQUENCES: DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE 
 
Public defender agencies are chronically mismanaged.  It is as if being the 
senior litigator in the office does not necessarily make you the best chief 
administrator. 
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A. Workload as Punishment 
 
One perpetual management problem is the use of caseload as a proxy for 
workload.  My first defender job was in appeals.  Each lawyer in my division was 
usually assigned four cases per month, chosen in a way that roughly equalized the 
pages of trial transcripts.  That sounds equitable, but it is actually an excellent 
example of the difference between caseload and workload, because the same case 
in two different lawyers’ hands can vary significantly in its workload.  Appellants 
have the option of filing one brief (opening brief) or two (opening brief and 
reply).
32
  Some lawyers always or almost always file both an opening and a reply 
brief.  Some lawyers never or almost never file both.  There was a thirty-five-page 
limit on opening briefs.
33
  There were lawyers in my office who routinely filed 
three—or four— page opening briefs and never filed reply briefs.  Others filed 
motions asking the appellate court for extra pages,
34
 which in my extensive 
personal experience,
35
 were always granted.  The result of this disparity was that 
there were lawyers who averaged forty or fifty or even sixty pages of legal writing 
per case and there were lawyers who averaged one tenth of that.  Both lawyers had 
the same caseload, but staggeringly different workloads.   
In the words of people who sell knives on TV, “But wait, there’s more!”  The 
decision whether to appeal beyond the initial court of appeals lay primarily with 
individual lawyers.
36
  Some of us asked higher courts to review most if not all of 
our losses.  Some lawyers never or almost never did.  I learned toward the end of 
my tenure, when I saw a document circulated by my boss, that there were lawyers 
in my office who dismissed an average of one-to-two appeals per month—or 
almost half their caseload.  They tended to be the same lawyers who filed tiny 
briefs and never appealed past the first automatic appeal.  When a lawyer in my 
office dismissed a case, they were not assigned another one in its place.  When a 
lawyer decided to pursue a case to a higher court, that petition did not count as 
additional caseload, but was done in addition to the four cases that kept coming 
each month.  When you put it together, the math becomes staggering, and the 
workload continuum at my office spread across the horizon like a New Mexico 
sunset.  At one end, there were those of us filing 150-250 pages of briefs, plus 
another 50 pages of petitions for higher review, each month.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, there were people who may not have written double digits of pages 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
32  See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 28. 
33  See MD. CT. R. 8-503(d)(1). 
34  See id. (permitting parties to request an extension of the page limits on Principle Briefs). 
35  I am sure that the rumors that this motion is referred to as the “Leonetti” in the clerk’s 
office are exaggerated. 
36  See Maryland Public Defender Act, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 16-101 to 16-403 
(West 2008) (mandating that the Office of the Public Defender represent indigent defendants charged 
with serious crimes before the trial courts and Court of Special Appeals, but not the Maryland Court 
of Appeals). 
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each month.  But, to our bosses, we had the same “caseload.”  Some of us were 
just less “efficient” at managing it. 
 
B. Outcome Aversion 
 
One of my pet peeves with my offices was that they refused (when I say 
“refused,” I am not using a rhetorical flourish for “did not;” I mean that I asked 
them, and they said “no”) to collect data on lawyers’ success rates (which, in 
appeals, would have been a largely bimodal measurement: affirmed or reversed—
that is a bit of an overgeneralization, but not an unfair one).  In the aggregate, 
when I worked there, the statewide reversal rate was eight percent, and our office-
wide reversal rate was twelve percent (you would expect the appellate division of a 
public defender’s office to beat the non-PD average).  My reversal rate was about 
forty-eight percent—i.e., almost half of my clients were no longer in prison when I 
was done representing them.  I had friends in the office with similar reversal rates.  
I reveal this not to brag, but for mathematical reasons.  First, I am not a statistician, 
but if there is an office of approximately twenty lawyers, and their collective 
success rate is twelve percent, and several lawyers have a success rate of almost 
fifty percent, it seems mathematically certain that there are other lawyers who are 
grossly underperforming in comparison to the average.  There were a couple of 
lawyers in my office whom I suspected of having a success rate near zero.  Second, 
it made no difference whatsoever.  Because the office did not gather these 
statistics—in fact, intentionally turned a blind eye to them—there were no rewards 
for high performers, no penalties for low ones.  Third, while I am not privy to the 
workloads or success rates of any lawyers beyond myself and a few close friends, I 
would be stunned if workload and success rate did not strongly correlate—i.e., if 
the 200-page lawyers were not also the fifty-percent lawyers and the ten-page 
lawyers were not also the near-zero lawyers.  I know that the correlation exists at 
least anecdotally across my small cohort of hard-worker high-performer 
colleagues. 
Until I became a public defender, I considered myself to be a model 
employee, but my bosses made it clear that they did not share that assessment.  
One of the things that I naively thought made me a valuable asset in an 
organization is that I do not believe in mindless complaining, which I define as 
pointing out a problem without suggesting a solution.  Toward the end of my first 
job, I went to my boss, described some of what I have detailed here, and made two 
suggestions: that the office collect and evaluate individual attorney reversal rates 
(and incorporate them into performance evaluations) and that the office assign 
duties on the basis of workload not caseload—e.g., assigning more cases to 
lawyers when they dismiss appeals and fewer to lawyers who engage in multiple 
levels of appeals.  Of course, the latter suggestion (giving more cases to the lazy 
lawyers and fewer to the hard working ones) would be a disaster for clients without 
the former (measuring and acting on poor performance, defined by outcome).  
When I had this conversation with my then-boss, did I expect a standing ovation?  
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Even I am not that naïve.  But I also did not expect to be shrieked at and thrown 
out of his office. 
Then, it got worse.  I had a case with a client who had been convicted of 
carjacking and attempted murder and sentenced to eighty-five years in prison.  I 
had serious doubts about his guilt, although that is not a particularly cognizable 
appellate issue.  I also had a good chance at getting him a reversal because the 
State had destroyed all of its exhibits after trial.  Where I practiced, if the appellate 
record was incomplete, and the appellant makes a good-faith effort to reconstruct it 
but cannot, he is entitled to summary reversal without a showing of prejudice.
37
  
But documenting the required good-faith effort is time consuming.  About a week 
before my opening brief was due, I had written two versions of the brief.  In the 
first, I argued that the record could not be reconstructed through due diligence and 
that my client was entitled to summary reversal.   In the second, I argued for 
reversal only on the merits of the claim that the exhibits were inadmissible, in case 
they were found or reconstructed.  I asked the Assistant Attorney General to agree 
to a one-month continuance while I finished my due diligence (so that I knew 
which brief to file), she agreed, and the court granted the stipulated extension. 
The next day, I was called into the office of the deputy who was responsible 
for case assignment, where she ordered me to file my brief immediately.  I 
explained the situation to her, and she replied with something along the lines of: “I 
don’t care.  Just file anything.”  I refused, and she ordered me again.  I refused a 
second time, then went to the head of the division (whom I thought should know 
that I had been ordered, essentially, to commit malpractice in the name of 
caseload), who shrieked at me for bothering him again (he might still have been 
pissed about the performance evaluation conversation).  As bad as my experience 
was, I am more worried about the lawyer who, afraid of being fired, follows the 
order.
38
 
My workload experience with my first office was not an isolated case.  I had a 
similar, “Please make an attempt to quantify, assess, and respond to outcome-based 
performance measures” conversation with my second boss shortly before I quit 
that job.  I had noticed similar (obvious) correlations in that office.  Lawyers who 
appeared to work the hardest (filing motions, going to trial, having contested 
sentencing hearings, litigating appeals) also appeared to achieve the best results for 
their clients (lesser charges, shorter sentences, dismissals, reversals).  My second 
boss was not a yeller.  He responded with a multi-page memo about why my idea 
was a terrible one, which mostly focused, in a passive-aggressive way, on my 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
37  See Wilson v. State, 639 A.2d 696, 701 (Md. 1994). 
38  I was never able to reconstruct the missing exhibits, and so I filed the version of the brief 
arguing for both summary reversal and reversal on the merits (based on what could be gleaned about 
them from their description in the transcript) the following month.  I left the office before the case 
was decided in an unpublished opinion, which would have been mailed privately to the lawyer 
assigned to take over the case for me, and so I do not know the outcome, but I continue to believe that 
the client’s conviction was likely reversed. 
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psychological infirmity.  It probably took him longer to draft that memo than it 
would have to develop objective performance measures. 
 
C. Seniority Is Paramount: “Experience” = “Skill” 
 
This is what I call “going to work at the post office,” by which I mean the 
common defender-office practice of promoting and remunerating lawyers solely on 
the basis of length of service, without regard (and often inversely proportionate) to 
the quality of their representation.  The first Federal Defender who hired me did 
not subscribe to the post-office method of management.  I was smart.  I worked 
hard.  I got results for my clients.  I got big raises.  My first annual merit raise was 
so big that I panicked and hung up on him when he gave it to me.  My second 
annual raise was equally lifestyle changing.  Then, he retired.  His replacement was 
apparently vying for the position of Postmaster General.  This was my first annual 
salary conversation with him: 
 
Him: “Hi, Carrie.  I’ve been reviewing salaries in the office, and I’ve 
discovered some concerning anomalies.  For example, you make more 
money than [a lawyer in the office two years longer than me] and the 
same amount of money as [a lawyer in the office four years longer than 
me].  I really want to iron out those asymmetries.” 
 
Me: “Honestly, I’m okay with that.” 
 
Him: “Thanks for understanding, Carrie.  So, this year, you are only 
going to get a COLA.  In fact, you are only going to get a COLA for the 
next several years, until this gets straightened out.” 
 
Me: “I’m sorry.  I guess I was unclear.  I’m okay with making more than 
[lawyer #1] and the same as [lawyer #2].  Apparently, [your predecessor] 
thought that I was a better lawyer.  And I think that there is evidence to 
support that conclusion.” 
 
Dial tone. 
 
D. Self-Flagellate Much? 
 
The result of these Dilbert-like management policies, which appear to be 
crafted almost intentionally to insulate the incompetent (who return the favor by 
keeping litigation costs low with their lack of work or skill), is that these offices 
rely on personal heroism to achieve their mission.  The incentives that exist 
encourage (I hope unintentionally) cutting corners and giving up.  The lawyers 
who insist on doing better for their clients do it at personal expense, not just in the 
long hours that they work for less money than their more-senior, less-zealous 
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colleagues, but also in the emotional strain of always being the bad guy—angering 
prosecutors and judges who are so unaccustomed to zealous advocacy that they no 
longer recognize it, viewing it instead as “obstructionism” or personality disorder; 
being ostracized by colleagues for making them look bad; and being reprimanded 
about “resource use,” “aggression,” and “rash choices.” 
This is the human part that no one ever talks about.  Even public defenders, 
who tend to be an antagonistic, anti-authoritarian bunch, do not like to be disliked, 
ridiculed, and yelled at, which is what happens to zealous advocates.  Because 
zealous defenders are rare, when one comes along, prosecutors and judges take it 
as an affront.  One time, I tried a case, at the end of which the jury deadlocked.  In 
fairness, the prosecutors should have easily gotten a conviction, but then again, I 
was a hell of a lawyer.  When it came time to schedule the retrial, both of the 
AUSAs actually cried at the hearing—not tears of sorrow, but of rage.  They 
implored the judge to stop me from “repeating what I had pulled at the first trial,” 
which was, just to be clear, attempting to create a reasonable doubt about my 
client’s guilt.  During this period of time, several other AUSAs would turn and 
walk the other way if they saw me coming in the courthouse, in a dramatic snub. 
Another time, I had painstakingly negotiated a plea agreement with an AUSA, 
which he later memorialized, and my client signed.  When it came time for 
sentencing, this AUSA breached the agreement, claiming that a word in the 
agreement (which he had drafted) did not mean what we had agreed that it meant.  
Unfortunately for him, we had an extensive email exchange about this term of the 
agreement, and it meant exactly what I said that it meant, and also (practice tip!): 
email creates a permanent written record.  This AUSA lied to the judge, in open 
court, denying that this (WRITTEN!) conversation had happened.  I offered our 
emails in evidence, catching him red handed in his lie (which so rarely happens 
but, I promise, is every bit as satisfying as you might imagine).  My client got the 
benefit of his bargain.  And I got an email from the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
informing me that AUSAs would no longer negotiate with me over email, the clear 
implication being that I had done some horribly unforgivable thing—you know, by 
proving that a prosecutor had lied in court. 
I can laugh about these things now, at least bitterly, and at the time, I put on a 
brave (perhaps even defiant) face.  The reactions that I invoked were patently 
ridiculous in light of the “sins” that I committed, but the truth is that it was rough.  
I am pretty sure that I am a mostly decent and nice person.  I am pretty sure that I 
was being castigated for making the only ethical choice that I had in light of my 
job description.  But it was still really hard to be treated like toxic waste, especially 
when my colleagues, who betrayed their obligations to their clients, were 
described, by contrast, as “collegial” and wizened by “experience.” 
In the end, it is too much to ask.  The system grinds down all but the most 
ardent square pegs of advocacy until they can fit into the round holes of apathy.  At 
a certain point, it is just too hard to always be the bad guy, the buzz kill, the 
lunatic. 
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VII. CASELOADS: ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
 
It is a truism that public defender caseloads are so high that they are per se 
unconstitutional in many places.
39
  But I think that the caseloads are just the tip of 
the iceberg. 
In the wake of Gideon v. Wainwright,
40
 many states and the federal 
government built well-funded, expertly staffed public defense agencies to fulfill 
their new constitutional duties to provide counsel for everyone who could not 
afford to retain an attorney.  Then, in the 1980s, two events collided to undo a lot 
of that.  First, the Reagan Era ushered in a new hostility toward government 
funding, especially for people whose job it was to coddle criminals.  Wanting to 
slash public defense budgets, like so many other previous social, cultural, and 
political third rails (state mental hospitals, public schools), became acceptable.  
Second, the Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington.
41
  Strickland was 
one of those the-Court-giveth-and-the-Court-taketh-away opinions.  The gift: the 
Court recognized that the right to counsel required more than simply a licensed 
attorney to stand (or sleep) next to a defendant, also demanding that said attorney 
effectively defend her client.  The take: the Strickland majority defined “effective” 
representation very forgivingly and grafted an unforgiving prejudice standard on 
top, so that the right has been honored in its breach ever since.
42
 
Around the time that the government’s budget austerity combined with the 
Court’s paper-tiger ruling on “effectiveness,” local governments (onto whom many 
States lob their public-defense obligations) started slashing their public defense 
systems.  For the previous generation of defenders, it was heart wrenching to 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
39  See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of 
Criminal Defense Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 324–26 (2002); Steve Hanlon, Needed: A 
Cultural Revolution, A.B.A. HUM. RTS., Apr. 2013, at 2; Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433 (1999); Roberta G. Mandel, The Appointment 
of Counsel to Indigent Defendants Is Not Enough: Budget Cuts Render the Right to Counsel Virtually 
Meaningless, FLA. B. J., Apr. 2009, at 43; Douglas Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Services & Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995). 
40  372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the right to appointed counsel). 
41  466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that, in order for ineffective assistance of counsel to 
warrant reversal of a conviction, Strickland had to show that counsel’s performance was so deficient 
that it ceased to constitute representation and that counsel’s errors so prejudiced the trial that it 
rendered the result unreliable). 
42  See, e.g., Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (holding that courts must apply a doubly 
deferential standard of review to a petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea 
bargaining); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122–23 (2011) (holding that the state courts were not 
unreasonable in finding that counsel’s advising Moore to enter a quick no-contest plea without 
moving to suppress his confession was neither deficient performance nor prejudicial); Cummings v. 
Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the state courts 
were not unreasonable in finding that counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence 
over Cummings’s objection at his capital sentencing hearing was neither deficient performance nor 
prejudicial). See generally Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The 
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 333. 
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watch their beloved, well-run agencies decimated.  Some soldiered on in the 
trenches.  Others left in protest, refugees to bigger and better jobs.  A list of former 
public defenders from the 1970s reads like a who’s whom of the accomplished— 
judges, federal lawyers, law professors, and directors of nonprofit organizations. 
The funding problem is now in its second generation, and this has created its 
own legacy problem that goes deeper than underfunding and overloading 
defenders.  Defender agencies have been gutted for so long that there are few 
lawyers left in them who remember what best practices looked like.  New lawyers 
now join offices with no institutional memory of zealous representation, no 
perspective on the size of the corners that they are cutting.  The second generation 
of defenders, the triage generation, which has never known sufficient funding, 
reasonable caseloads, or attentive and wise trial judges is now training a third 
generation of lawyers, passing on the ignorance.  When I was a defender, I had 
colleagues who I truly doubted would know how to practice law, if the urge ever 
hit them, the caseloads eased, or the funding returned.  The brain is like any 
muscle; it atrophies with long-term disuse. 
Moral character also does not get exercised nearly as often as it should in 
these offices.  The rationalization is usually something like: there is nothing that 
we can do about caseloads; we just have to do the best that we can with the only 
system that we have.  That is, simply, untrue, unless the primary goal of a public 
defender is zero personal risk.  Here are the ethical responses to high caseloads that 
I have come up with: (1) You can tell your boss no, even if doing so gets you fired.  
You may have to eat cat food for a while, but I will represent you pro bono in your 
wrongful termination suit.
43
  Even at-will employees can be wrongfully terminated 
if they are fired for blowing the whistle or exercising a constitutional right (in this 
case, that of their clients to effective representation).
44
  (2) You can declare a 
conflict of interest.  Repeat after me: “Your Honor, because of my high caseload, 
agreeing to represent this client would pose a conflict of interest because it would 
necessitate my inadequately representing another client—in other words, it would 
force me to make a choice of whom to represent and whom to neglect.”45  (3) You 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
43  Individual results will vary.  Possible side effects include losing your lawsuit, since I’m not 
an employment lawyer. 
44  See, e.g., Mark Hansen, P.D. Funding Struck Down, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 18 (describing 
how a New Orleans judge held the city's entire indigent defense program unconstitutional because 
among other reasons it required public defenders to handle more than 300 cases at a time). 
45  See Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607–08 (Mo. 2012) (holding 
that compelling a public defender, through excessive caseloads, to choose between the rights of 
multiple clients, created an inevitable conflict of interest); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (concluding that public defenders have an ethical 
obligation to withdraw and refuse new appointments when excessive caseloads prevent ethical 
representation); ABA, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF INDIGENT DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE CASELOADS 
12 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative 
/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf 
(dictating that public defender organizations faced with a caseload so excessive that its lawyers 
cannot render effective assistance to every client must seek judicial relief from appointment to 
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can rebel passively aggressively.  Ask for a one year continuance of every case, 
citing your caseload as grounds.  Request that the court set hearings in your cases 
at 7:00 a.m. or 7:00 p.m., citing your impossibly choked schedule as grounds.  Will 
these requests be granted?  No.  If you make the record well, will they make 
interesting appellate issues?  Yes. 
I am sure that there are other options.  The point is not which one of these or 
other choices is best.  The point is that you almost never see public defenders try 
any of them. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
Back when I was a public defender, from time to time, a friend or colleague 
would quit in protest, usually due to the caseloads and the poor performance that 
they caused.  At the time, I would think what most public defenders think: How 
irrational, immature, and self-absorbed.  What were you thinking; now that you’re 
gone they (judges, legislatures, administrators) will suddenly have an epiphany and 
fix the system?  All that you’ve accomplished is taking another good lawyer out of 
a system that desperately needs them.  These days, I have switched sides in that 
debate.  If the executioner refuses to throw the switch, I’m sure that they will get 
one who will.  That does not make the executioner’s job a moral one. 
My guess is that eighty percent of the public defenders who read this Essay 
will be pissed.  Their reaction will range from perturbed (“Oh, great, one more 
person contributing to the stereotype about ‘dump truck’ public defenders.  
Thanks, that makes my incredibly difficult job easier.”), to enraged (“This ivory 
tower quitter thinks that after only six years of practice she knows more than 
people who have been doing this stuff for decades!  No wonder she got bad 
evaluations!”).  I didn’t write this for them.  They live in a world of such overwork 
and underpay that it is structurally impossible for them to engage in best practices 
for their clients.  At best, they can be minimally competent.  They know it, and 
they don’t want to know it.  Their defensiveness cannot be overcome. 
I wrote this for the other twenty percent.  Do not read into this Essay that they 
do not exist.  Over the years, I have worked with brilliant, talented, hard-working 
people.  I am in awe of how they stay in the game, some of them without becoming 
alcoholics.  They are the ones reading this and thinking, “Thank god.  Someone is 
saying it out loud.”   I would love to tell you that I have a brilliant solution to these 
problems, a way to keep the twenty percent going to work every day and get the 
eighty percent either out or in line, but I don’t, beyond the obvious.  We grossly 
underfund our public defense.  As long as we do, I don’t think that we can re-staff 
and re-acculturate them. 
                                                                                                                                                   
additional cases); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2014) (“[A] lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation . . . will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client . . . [or] by a personal interest of the lawyer. . . .  [unless] the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected 
client.”). 
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My goal for this Essay is more modest: to start the conversation, to reassure 
good, young defenders in dysfunctional offices that they are not crazy, and to 
empower them to challenge the systems in which they work.  If this Essay sparks a 
robust debate in the lunchrooms of a handful of defender agencies, instigated by 
people who recognize themselves or their colleagues in this Essay, it will be a 
beginning. 
You might be thinking: two offices are not a large data set.  Maybe her 
experience is anomalous.  Or even: Professor Leonetti seems to be the common 
denominator in these stories.  Maybe she is just self-righteous, arrogant, and 
impossible to work with.  What can I say?  This might be true, but my experience 
was not anomalous.  I believe that it was typical.  Rapping has documented many 
of these same phenomena in the New Orleans Defender’s Office that he helped to 
reform: the cooption of public defenders through the “team player” mentality and 
expectations of streamlining, the “pro forma” arraignments conducted by duty 
lawyers who had never met their “clients,” the process by which defenders 
accepted without challenging the shortcomings of their own representation, and the 
way that defender organizations promote from within on the basis of lawyering 
“success” rather than management acumen.46 
The sad truth is that, if you asked around, the consensus would be that I 
worked in two of the better offices.  The Federal Defenders are considered the gold 
standard of public defense
47
 (and, to be fair, I think that many offices, albeit 
perhaps not the one that I worked in, are), and the state system that I worked in is 
one of the best—a relatively well-funded statewide defender system, at all levels of 
litigation, in a large metropolitan area with relatively high salaries and good 
benefits.  All of which means that it probably gets much worse in some other 
defender offices. 
Which leads me back to my brother.  He was arrested sometime early on a 
Wednesday morning.  I started calling his local public defender service Thursday 
morning.  I was told that he would be arraigned at 3:00.  I left a message for the 
attorney whom I was told was the duty defender, only it turned out that he was not.  
I told him that my brother was mentally ill and could not post bail.  I also told him 
that I would be willing to be my brother’s custodian for the purpose of conditional 
release, if he would agree to certain mental-health conditions.  He told me that his 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
46  See Rapping, supra note 3, at 190–99. 
47  See, e.g., Inga L. Parsons, “Making It a Federal Case”: A Model for Indigent 
Representation, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837, 839 n.7 (1997); Harvie J. Wilkinson III, In Defense 
of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1126–28 (2014); cf. Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo 
Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2008) (discussing the significant quality difference between 
federal public defenders and appointed private attorneys). 
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office did not usually “visit” the issue of detention at arraignment (a good example 
of a local practice of questionable constitutionality).
48
 
I arrived at the courtroom in the jail about half an hour before arraignments 
were scheduled to begin.  I relayed my information a second time to the duty 
attorney, who told me that she “could not” raise the issue of my brother’s release at 
that hearing, but that his assigned attorney would address it the following day, a 
Friday, which also happened to be my brother’s 40th birthday. 
I spent my brother’s birthday leaving messages for anyone and everyone with 
a voice-mail account at the public defender service.  I was told initially that no one 
was “legally allowed to take my call” without my brother’s written consent (not 
true).
49
  I was told that every lawyer in the office would be in court all day, so 
nothing could be done for my brother.  Bear in mind: a motion seeking his release 
could be a page long.  It just has to be filed to be put on the court’s calendar for a 
hearing.  I finally called the head of the defender service, who told me that he 
would call the branch office representing my brother and try to get someone to call 
me back.  I finally received a call at around 3:00 that afternoon, much too late for a 
motion to be calendared that day.  So, my brother spent his 40th birthday in the 
mental-health isolation unit in jail.  He (probably obviously) spent the weekend 
there.  And (perhaps less obviously) remained there another week. 
I was never able to get my brother’s motion for release calendared.  On his 
ninth day in jail, I broke down and bailed him out on the private agreement that he 
comply with a mental-health treatment program.  The fact that I have to enforce 
this agreement personally, instead of as a court’s condition of release, makes it less 
likely that he will comply, which is in neither his best interest nor the best interest 
of the other people who live in his county.  He had his first meeting with an 
attorney more than a month after arrest.  Less than a week later, at his first status 
hearing, she handed him a plea agreement and advised him to take it, because she 
did not think that his prospects at trial were great.  Neither did I, given that trial 
prospects are not inherent, but rather the end result of the attorney’s work. 
Was the quickie plea deal malpractice?  Probably not.  Best practices?  
Definitely not: my brother never even saw or discussed initial discovery with his 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
48  See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
required that defendants arrested without a warrant or indictment were entitled to a prompt judicial 
determination of probable cause and the basis for detention); see also Cnty. of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that, barring extraordinary circumstances, “prompt” 
meant presenting the defendant within forty-eight hours of arrest); cf. Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 
1205, 1207 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the court abused its discretion when it detained the defendant 
pursuant to a bail schedule without considering his relevant personal characteristics); Clark v. Hall, 
53 P.3d 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (“[The statute] sets bail at a predetermined, nondiscretionary 
amount and disallows oral recognizance bonds under any circumstances. We find the statute is 
unconstitutional because it violates the due process rights of citizens of this State to an individualized 
determination to bail.”); Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, A.B.A 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 12, 14. 
49  Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2014). 
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lawyer.  I went with my brother the one time that he had a full interview with his 
lawyer, and there was no indication at that meeting that any investigation had been 
conducted.  Could a different lawyer have gotten him a better result?  Maybe not.  
Did I urge my brother to take the deal?  It was a no-time misdemeanor deal with 
diversion to mental-health court.  Absolutely.  Because that is how the system 
works.
